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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, Dylan LeValley, then a third-year law student at Seattle
University School of Law, authored a publication proposing and
encouraging courts to conclude that autonomous vehicle manufacturers,
similar to common carriers of passengers, owe the public the highest duty
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of care and thus should be liable for even the slightest negligence.1
LeValley asserted such a conclusion was premised on the fact that
autonomous vehicles share similar characteristics to common carriers of
passengers, and policy rationales for holding common carriers to the
highest standard of care are similarly applicable.2 When such a proposal
was made, the future of autonomous vehicles was still in the early stages
of development without much known regarding the utility of the
technology.3
However, in 2016, autonomous vehicle manufacturers like Tesla
announced all vehicles manufactured moving forward would have selfdriving capabilities.4 Such a pronouncement by Tesla and other similarly
situated autonomous vehicle manufacturers raises today the same concerns
identified by LeValley in 2013: How should liability be assessed when
autonomous vehicles are involved in vehicular accidents, including when
assessed liability involves a real cost to human life and not just property
damage?
Since 2016, there have been several fatalities involving autonomous
vehicles, including most notably the death of Elaine Herzberg, a pedestrian
in Tempe, Arizona, on March 18, 2018.5 Ms. Herzberg died when an
autonomous Volvo owned by Uber failed to detect her crossing a major
thoroughfare, striking Herzberg at 38 miles per hour—and by some
conflicting reports at 40 miles per hour—resulting with Uber suspending
all autonomous vehicle testing thereafter.6 This is a pressing issue for
which courts and society at large have yet to determine a consistent and
particular liability scheme to use in addressing this issue in spite of the
public safety need.
For purposes of this Comment update, I will: (I) provide a brief
background on autonomous vehicles and principles of common carrier
1. Dylan LeValley, Autonomous Vehicle Liability—Application of Common Carrier Liability,
SEATTLE U. L. REV. SUPRA 5, 6 (2013).
2. Id.
3. Tony Genua & Sam Mitter, A Setback in the Move Towards a Driverless World, AGF (Mar.
31, 2018), https://www.agf.com/ca/en/insights/market-commentaries/articles/article-a-driverlessworld.jsp [https://perma.cc/JTD3-B9W9].
4. Jordon Golson & Dieter Bohn, All New Tesla Cars Now Have Hardware for ‘Full Self-Driving
Capabilities,’ THE VERGE (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/10/19/13340938/
tesla-autopilot-update-model-3-elon-musk-update [https://perma.cc/6PJN-HNX4].
5. Ryan Randazzo, Who was Really at Fault in Fatal Uber Crash? Here’s the Whole Story, AZ
CENTRAL (Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/tempe/2019/03/17/one-yearafter-self-driving-uber-rafaela-vasquez-behind-wheel-crash-death-elaine-herzberg-tempe/1296676
002 [https://perma.cc/CT6E-KGBU].
6. Id; see also Patrick Sisson & Alissa Walker, Uber’s Fatal Crash: Are Self-Driving Tests
Endangering Pedestrians?, CURBED (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.curbed.com/2018/3/19/17140922/
uber-crash-tempe-fatal-driverless-car [https://perma.cc/F3M6-KJJM] (video of accident embedded in
article).
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liability; (II) provide reasons why such application of common carrier
liability principles to autonomous vehicle manufacturers is appropriate;
and (III) provide public policy justifications for such an application based
on developments since publication of the original Comment in 2013.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2015, Tesla Chief Executive Elon Musk declared “the Model S
[is] a very sophisticated computer on wheels . . . Tesla is a software
company as much as it is a hardware company. A huge part of what Tesla
is, is a Silicon Valley software company.”7 Industry analysts agreed with
such assessment based on Tesla’s vehicle design approach akin to
smartphones.8 Redefining and reimagining a vehicle as now just being a
sophisticated phone-like platform on which various software applications
may exist and be periodically updated remotely by the manufacturer is
understandably innovative for the average consumer. However, such
redefining and reimagining, even if seemingly innovative, raises complex
issues of liability, specifically: how should liability be assessed when a
vehicle is in autonomous operation mode and subsequently involved in an
accident?9 The answer: fashion a liability scheme based on common
carrier principles, and then apply it to autonomous vehicle manufacturers
(AVMs).
A. Autonomous Vehicle History, Development,
and Automation Levels
Almost within years of the creation and development of the first mass
produced vehicle by Henry Ford, the Model T,10 individuals began
experimenting and developing autonomous vehicles or “phantom autos”
controlled by a system using radio waves.11 In the 1990s, researchers,
controlling for speed and braking, traveled 2,797 miles hands-free in a
self-driving minivan from Pittsburgh to San Diego, and the early 2000s
brought self-parking systems.12 However, the biggest thrust in
development of autonomous vehicle technology came with Google’s selfdriving project, Waymo, in 2009.13 By the end of 2014, Google reported
7. Jerry Hirsch, Elon Musk: Model S Not a Car but a ‘Sophisticated Computer on Wheels,’ L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-musk-computer-on-wheels20150319-story.html [https://perma.cc/FKA7-ABHV].
8. Id.
9. LeValley, supra note 1, at 6.
10. Model T, HISTORY (Apr. 26, 2010), https://www.history.com/topics/inventions/model-t
[https://perma.cc/5EY3-E9GY].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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over two million miles driven by Google’s autonomous vehicle, all
computer controlled.14 Major vehicle manufacturers took notice, including
Mercedes Benz which began developing semi-autonomous vehicle
features like self-steering, lane assist, and accident avoidance.15 Not long
after, Tesla announced in 2016 that all of their vehicles manufactured
moving forward would have “full self-driving capabilities.”16
Meanwhile, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE),17 an
international association of engineers and related technical experts within
aerospace, automotive, and commercial vehicle industries, developed a set
of modes and levels to understand vehicle automation, which are used by
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).18 These
six levels are: no automation; driver assistance; partial automation;
conditional automation; high automation; and full automation.19 No
automation means “zero autonomy [and] the driver performs all driving
[related] tasks.”20 Driver assistance is when the vehicle is designed with
driving assist features but primarily controlled by the driver.21 Partial
automation is when the vehicle combines driver-controlled actions with
automated functions like acceleration or steering.22 Conditional
automation still requires a driver, but the driver is not required to monitor
the environment.23 High automation is when the “vehicle is capable of
performing all driving functions under certain conditions” with the option
of driver control.24 Lastly, full automation is when the “vehicle is capable
of performing all driving functions under all conditions” with the option
of driver control remaining.25

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Golson & Bohn, supra note 4.
17. About SAE International, SAE INT’L, https://www.sae.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/9VHGYJTT].
18. Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles-safety [https://perma.cc/DA54F4PA] [hereinafter NHTSA].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. It is interesting to note that the varying levels of automation likely coincides with the
development of autonomous vehicle technology over the last two decades. Although the NHTSA
favorably provides information on the benefits of autonomous vehicles generally, the agency
interestingly does not posit a determinative position for assigning liability when autonomous vehicles
crash. Instead, the response to the question is “beyond the technical considerations that policymakers
are working to address before automated vehicles are made available.” Id.
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B. Common Carrier Factors: Control and Care
“A common carrier is one who holds itself out to the general public
as engaged in the business of transporting persons or property from one
place to another.”26 Although AVMs do not fit the characteristics of
common carriers generally, AVMs do share two categories: control and
care.27 When determining whether an entity is a common carrier, courts
will consider several factors, including: “(1) whether an operator controls
the manner of transportation; and (2) whether a passenger is placed in the
operator’s care.”28 Although AVMs do not fall squarely within the
characteristics and classification of a common carrier, the aforementioned
factors create a starting point—an opportunity to fashion and develop a
new liability scheme for autonomous vehicles and their manufacturers—
and hopefully advance the law forward to begin grappling with the
complexity of the legal issues raised by such rapid development in the
technological space.
II. WHY APPLICATION OF A COMMON CARRIER LIABILITY SCHEME TO
AVM’S IS APPROPRIATE
AVMs are not in the traditional enterprise of “transporting persons
or property from one place to another” in order to be considered common
carriers because AVMs design and manufacture the means of transporting
persons or property from one place to another.29 However, the application
of common carrier principles to AVMs as a liability scheme is appropriate
because AVMs control the manner of transportation when autonomous
vehicles are engaged in full automation mode, thus placing passengers
subsequently in their care.30
First, AVMs control the manner of transportation because
autonomous vehicles in a fully automated state use the AVM-developed
software and hardware incorporated into the design of the vehicle.31 When
full automation mode is engaged, the software takes over the functions and
decisions associated with driving without a need for human input. In other
words, software and hardware developed and incorporated into
autonomous vehicles by AVMs work in unison to effectively pick from an
internal cache of predetermined judgment calls—algorithms of calculated

26. Bennett Truck Transp., L.L.C. v. Williams Bros. Constr., 256 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Tex. App.
2008).
27. LeValley, supra note 1, at 23.
28. Id. (citing Hunt ex rel. Gende v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Serv., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 904 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2004)).
29. Bennett, 256 S.W.3d at 733.
30. LeValley, supra note 1, at 23.
31. Id.
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risks and consequences associated with a particular course of action—
without practically considering human passengers’ input.32 For example,
these complex algorithms dictate when to safely change lanes, accelerate
and decelerate, or engage in collision avoidance maneuvers.33 This is
admittedly innovative and has the propensity to generally lower vehicular
collisions and associated human fatalities.34 However, it reasonably
follows that because AVMs develop and implement such software and
hardware in autonomous vehicles to engage in such a decision-making
process, AVMs are effectively in control of the manner of transportation—
a factor used by courts in assessing whether an entity is a common
carrier.35 And because AVMs are effectively in control of an autonomous
vehicle, AVMs should reasonably be liable for harms associated with
failures arising in autonomous vehicles while engaged in full
automation mode.
Additionally, it is unfeasible and unconvincing to assert that once
autonomous vehicles are sold in commerce, AVMs should remain
responsible for providing periodic general maintenance and upkeep of the
autonomous vehicle like tire rotation, windshield wiper replacement,
battery charging needs, etcetera. However, even when general
maintenance and upkeep of an autonomous vehicle is reasonably imputed
to autonomous vehicle owners, it is nevertheless unreasonable to impute
responsibility to autonomous vehicle owners to provide the necessary
software maintenance and upkeep in the autonomous vehicle.36 In other
words, aside from the likely impractical reasons, it is unreasonable to
expect an autonomous vehicle owner to provide general maintenance and
upkeep on proprietary AVM-designed software.
In fact, AVMs like Tesla periodically provide over-the-air updates to
“mak[e] your car safer and more capable” and thus exhibit some degree of
responsibility to provide software maintenance without shouldering it on
owners.37 It then reasonably follows that because AVMs periodically push
software updates and provide general maintenance on their proprietary
autonomous vehicle software, AVMs acknowledge control of the means
of transportation.38 AVMs acknowledge their role and responsibility to
ensure autonomous vehicle software is updated and working as designed
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. NHTSA, supra note 18.
35. Bennett Truck Transp., L.L.C. v. Williams Bros. Constr., 256 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Tex. App.
2008).
36. Id.
37. Support-Software Updates, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/support/software-updates
[https://perma.cc/8CX5-EF6P].
38. Bennett, 256 S.W.3d at 733.
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because they effectively control the manner of transportation—the
autonomous vehicle.39
Furthermore, AVMs effectively encourage consumers to relinquish
control over their vehicles and place “themselves in the care of the
manufacturers that design those systems[;]”40 that is, AVMs are implicitly
assuming care over passengers in autonomous vehicles when AVMs
actively equip all future vehicle models with full automation level
capabilities.41 Actively purporting features in which numerous, complex
algorithms alleviate the need for human input to decide when to change
lanes, accelerate and decelerate, engage in collision avoidance maneuvers,
or even provide an overall reduction in the likelihood of accident,
demonstrates an assumption of care on the part of AVMs generally.42
Again, as innovative and seemingly possible to lower vehicular
collisions and human fatalities associated with such generally, is it
logically unreasonable for AVMs to be held liable when their actions
strongly suggest a willingness to assume care over passengers in
autonomous vehicles?43 The answer: it is logically reasonable for future
courts to conclude that when AVMs encourage consumers to use
autonomous vehicles and install such a technological capability, this
demonstrates a AVMs willingness to place consumers in the
operator’s care.44
III. PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR APPLYING A COMMON
CARRIER-LIKE LIABILITY SCHEME TO AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
MANUFACTURERS
Many technology, economic, and business experts45—even 2020
Presidential candidates46—agree we are now in the beginning of the
“Fourth Industrial Revolution,” a massive advance in the way we use
sophisticated technologies to live, work, and relate to others.47 This
39. See LeValley, supra note 1, at 23.
40. Id. at 23.
41. Hirsch, supra note 7.
42. Id; see also Tristian Greene, Consumer Groups Ask FTC to Investigate “Deceptive” Tesla
Autopilot Marketing, THE NEXT WEB (May 24, 2018), https://thenextweb.com/artificialintelligence/2018/05/24/consumer-groups-ask-ftc-to-investigate-deceptive-tesla-autopilot-marketing/
[https://perma.cc/LQR6-RWHT].
43. NHTSA, supra note 18.
44. See Bennett, 256 S.W.3d at 733.
45. Bernard Marr, The 4th Industrial Revolution Is Here–Are You Ready?, FORBES (Aug. 13,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/08/13/the-4th-industrial-revolution-is-hereare-you-ready/#64898efc628b [https://perma.cc/RCN6-RQD4].
46. Jordan Weissmann, Andrew Yang Keeps Talking About the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
What the Heck Is That?, SLATE (Oct. 18, 2019), https://slate.com/business/2019/10/andrew-yangfourth-industrial-revolution.html [https://perma.cc/38X3-K85K].
47. Id.
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revolution has and will continue disrupting practically every industry,
including the automotive industry. The major promise of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution is to improve the quality of life and raise incomes in
developing countries while continuing to create efficiencies and
conveniences in fully developed countries.48 However, there is increasing
demand for corporate entities to provide necessary accountability where
governments have yet to create adequate and consistent regulatory
frameworks within the tech space.49 Pierre Nanterme, former Chairman
and CEO of Accenture, a multiservice company with a strategic consulting
practice in the digital and technological spaces,50 stated “The Fourth
Industrial Revolution demands that CEOs take responsibility for the
massive transformation of their businesses and for the extraordinary
impact that this transformation will have on wider society.” 51
Recently, the NHTSA investigated the twelfth accident involving an
autonomous vehicle while engaged in Tesla Autopilot.52 Although the
accident resulted in only physical damage to a Tesla and a Connecticut
State Trooper vehicle,53 other accidents have unfortunately resulted in the
actual loss of human life. In Delray Beach, Florida, a 50-year-old Tesla
driver was killed when Autopilot was engaged for mere seconds before
colliding with a semi-trailer, ending underneath it and the impact shearing
the roof off.54 The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
concluded neither the driver or the Autopilot “executed evasive
maneuvers” to avoid the collision.55 The NTSB further concluded that a
“lack of safeguards” contributed to the victim’s death and declined to
impose blame on anyone.56 Meanwhile, AVM CEO’s like Elon Musk
instead publicly comment, “Our vehicle autonomy reduces the probability

48. See Marr, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. How We Work with Our Clients, ACCENTURE, https://www.accenture.com/us-en/about/
company-index [https://perma.cc/US7M-3K62].
51. Pierre Nanterme, Digital Disruption Has Only Just Begun, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan.
17, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/digital-disruption-has-only-just-begun/
[https://perma.cc/ASF9-NFYF].
52. Bill Howard, Another Tesla Crash, Another Investigation into Autopilot, EXTREMETECH
(Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/303538-another-tesla-crash-another-invest
igation-into-autopilot [https://perma.cc/J4N6-44BR].
53. Id.
54. Scott Sutton, Tesla Driver Killed After Crash Involving Semi in Western Delray Beach,
WPTV (Mar. 2, 2019), https://www.wptv.com/news/region-s-palm-beach-county/serious-crashinvestigated-on-u-s-441-in-southern-palm-beach-county [https://perma.cc/N8X2-G9L4].
55. Andrew J. Hawkins, Tesla’s Autopilot Was Engaged When Model 3 Crashed into Truck,
Report States, THE VERGE (May 16, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/16/18627766/teslaautopilot-fatal-crash-delray-florida-ntsb-model-3 [https://perma.cc/TQN7-JSJB].
56. Id.
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of a death by 30% . . . [t]he statistics are unequivocal that Autopilot
improves safety.”57
As a result, if governments have yet to develop regulatory
frameworks to address the “lack of safeguards” and AVMs are unwilling
to accept responsibility for the adverse impacts their technologies may
bear on society—while AVM CEO’s claim the complete opposite of what
is actually occurring—is the consumer and public at a loss? The answer is
no because courts are in a vital position to feasibly do something about it.
Although AVMs are not considered common carriers in the traditional
sense, they do likely satisfy two factors: control and care. And because
AVMs likely satisfy these factors generally shared with common carriers,
the argument is strengthened to conclude that AVMs should be held to
similar heightened standard of care as common carriers.58
Courts have determined common passenger carriers are held to a
higher standard of care since passengers have little to no control over the
means of conveyance.59 Passengers “turn over control of their own safety
and rely on the carrier for their safe delivery.”60 In the context of
autonomous vehicles, passengers have control over the when and where to
go but lack the necessary expertise to determine the how to go.61 The
“how” is practically left up entirely to an AVM to determine using their
expertise to develop and implement the software found in autonomous
vehicles.
Additionally, the manner in which AVMs are fulfilling the how
aspect is likely having the effect of incentivizing passengers to engage in
conduct that distracts and lessens passengers from being attentive to their
surroundings while an autonomous vehicle is engaged in full automation.62
For example, there have been reports of passengers in Tesla’s reading,
sleeping, shooting lewd films, or even checking on pets in the back seat
while the vehicle is full automation mode.63 Although AVMs designed and
implemented the ability for human operators to override and reengage
driving tasks manually, a passenger would likely make a situation worse
by interfering; that is, by having been passive and inattentive to
57. Michael J. Coren, Tesla’s First Accident Report Claims It’s Four Times Safer Than the US
Average. Maybe., QUARTZ (Oct. 5, 2018), https://qz.com/1414132/teslas-first-accident-report-claimsits-four-times-safer-than-the-us-average/ [https://perma.cc/65EJ-A5ZY]; Q3 2018 Vehicle Safety
Report, TESLA (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.tesla.com/blog/q3-2018-vehicle-safety-report [https://per
ma.cc/2DRJ-H2CY].
58. LeValley, supra note 1, at 23–24.
59. Id. at 24. (citing Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Lawson, 143 F. 834, 837 (7th Cir.
1906)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. LeValley, supra note 1, at 25.
63. See Howard, supra note 52.
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surroundings, an autonomous vehicle passenger may attempt to reengage
and override the autonomous vehicle system in an emergency with an
incomplete awareness of the situation to their peril.64 It is reasonably
foreseeable that when AVMs developed and implemented autonomous
vehicle technologies into their vehicles, passengers would up the ante by
substituting the “computer” for their own alertness and attentiveness. Even
if AVMs did not intend for such behaviors and do heavily disclaim against
them, AVMs cannot deny they have responsibility for the unintended
consequences of the technology they are introducing into commerce and
society as a whole.
CONCLUSION
Elon Musk claimed “Tesla is a software company as much as it is a
hardware company”65 with likely emphasis on software. However, this is
a veiled attempt by an AVM to persuade future courts to not apply the
same legal approaches to ascribing fault and liability as courts currently
do with traditional vehicle manufacturers because AVMs are in a new
category. Nonetheless, even if AVMs arguably should be treated
differently because using approaches like products liability would be
generally inadequate, recognizing AVMs share vital commonalities with
common carriers would likely suffice. While imperfect, using a liability
scheme that draws from common carrier liability principles recognizes the
desired conformity and adequacy AVMs seek when courts assess and
determine potential liability to be assigned. Such a liability scheme would
be accurate to demonstrate AVMs control the manner of transportation
through autonomous vehicles while encouraging passengers to place their
sense of care in proprietary, autonomous vehicle technology over
themselves. As a result, if such a liability scheme were to be fashioned and
adopted by courts when dealing with situations involving autonomous
vehicles, then AVM CEO’s like Elon Musk will likely be haunted and
mourn the day they made such public characterizations of their
autonomous vehicle technologies as more software than hardware.

64. Id.
65. Hirsch, supra note 7.

